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I'm told there are no more Weimar 
Republicans balancing Swiss Bank 
Accounts, pulling gold-plated 
watches out of vest pockets and 
maintaining that Kristallnacht was 
only a street brawl, an isolated inci-
dent not worthy of our attention. 
I've read there are no more 
Schutzstaffel conducting camp or-
chestras in front of signs that say 
"Arbeit Macht Frei" and planting 
flowers at the entrance of cremato-
riums. 
A small child approaches my desk 
and chants a psalm he learned ear-
lier that day. His mother selects 
five new works of fiction as she 
pushes a stroller that carries his 
baby sister. 
I want to believe there are some 
boys who are just going through a 
phase at a certain time of their lives. 








Living with and Understanding Each Other 
disClosure interviews 
David Ingram 
( 11 April 1998) 
In the Spring of 1998, David 
Ingram, Professor of Philosophy at 
Loyola University of Chicago, vis-
ited Lexington as a Distinguished 
Visiting Scholar. He delivered a pa-
per on "Racial Redistricting: Old-
Fashioned Segregation or Last 
Bastion of Community Empower-
ment," and presented the Keynote 
Address for the University's First 
Annual Philosophy Graduate Stu-
dent Conference entitled "Indi-
vidual Freedom and Social 
Equality: Habermas' Democratic 
Revolution in the Social 
Contractarian Justification of Law" 
(to be published in Habermas: The 
LibranJ of Living Philosophers, edited 
by Lewis Hahn). Professor Ingram 
was generous in talking to us about 
topics ranging from race and na-
tionality to aesthetic rationality. 
In his most recently published 
work, Reason, HistonJ and Politics, 
Ingram discusses rationality, meta-
phor and the grounds of legitimacy 
in modem political philosophy. Re-
jecting the currently dominant sci-
entific rationality and drawing on a 
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rich Anglo- and European philosophical history, Ingram defends a 
broader conception of rationality tied to art criticism and aesthetic 
judgment. Rather than seeing the content of science transmitted 
through logical constructs, Ingram points to the vital role that meta-
phors play in paradigm shifts. He holds that metaphors allow us a non-
reductive means of translating between paradigms, world views, etc. 
In our discussion Ingram focuses on his work on metaphor, tying 
this issue into questions of culture, race and nationalism. While recog-
nizing that nationalism and racism are fictions, he nonetheless holds 
that they play a role in our identities, which are developed in communi-
ties. But communities---even nations-must interact with each other, 
learn and grow from that interaction, or die off. Further, he defends the 
position that community and community standards ought to play some 
role in defining community rights without abandoning the individual 
to the whims of the state. He ends the discussion expressing his deep 
commitment to the belief that what is important is the role of communi-
cation in providing a means to understanding one another- a belief 
which informs the entire exchange. 
disClosure: David, yesterday in your talk you claimed that much of our 
identity is self-chosen. I'm just wondering, what role do you think com-
munity plays in forming identity? If community plays a large role, how 
is identity self-chosen? 
David Ingram: Well, I think that it plays a stronger role initially. Our 
identities are shaped through our social interactions. Initially, of 
course, the identities that we develop are ones that are largely given to 
us through our interactions with our parents, primary reference per-
sons, and other people with whom we don't choose to associate. We 
don't self-consciously choose the manner in which we associate with 
them, and yet it's through this interaction that we internalize certain 
values, we imitate certain behaviors, certain role models, we pattern 
our behavior after them, and this is the beginning of communication; 
it's very mimetic. It's the beginning of being a person and developing a 
character. I think there's a lot to what Aristotle had to say about the re-
lationship between practice and character formation. That obviously is 
a process that prevails up until persons begin to reflect upon who and 
what they are. Without trying to draw a hard and fast boundary, that 
happens with the onset of adolescence. Depending on the circum-
stances, depending upon the kind of interactions we have with people, 
if they permit questioning and soul-searching, then we can arrive at 
that point where we can begin to choose our associations, modify the 
kinds of relationships that we have-· which is either more or less criti-
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cal and questioning. To the extent that they are critical and questioning, 
we can modify who we are. 
dC: You've been talking about this on the level of family. What about 
on the level of nation? Rousseau felt that the individual should lose his 
identity to the state or the nation. What role does the nation play in 
helping us form our identities. Must there be an ability to question 
within the nation so that we can form our own identity? 
DI: So what does "nation" mean? In some ways, nation here doesn't 
apply to the United States. One thinks of nation as referring to a distinct 
people or a distinct culture; that's becoming much less so. When Win-
ston Churchill wrote his book about the history of the English people-
of course including the United States there-he was talking about a 
nation in some sense: A group of people with a distinct cultural identity 
that colonized significant portions of the globe. But the concept of a dis-
tinct people now seems to be increasingly outdated. As the United 
States becomes increasingly multicultural, what remains of the Ameri-
can nation? Maybe what we are approximating in this country is what 
Habermas and Rawls liken to a constitutional community of strangers 
in which persons express loyalty to one another through recognition of 
the principle of rights and democratic self-determination. That kind of 
loyalty doesn't constitute the sort of substantive culturally homoge-
neous unity that was ascribed to the nation. 
So when I'm talking about "nation" in this context, I'm associating it 
with a nineteenth century conception of nationalism in which patrio-
tism is linked to the sharing of a language, customs, traditions, perhaps 
even a religion. Driven by intellectuals, litterateurs, and political ideo-
logues, the concept of a nation or people had its origins in fiction, not 
nature. As ideological constraints these concepts galvanized many of 
the democratic struggles in the nineteenth century, and I think that's 
what you see today in areas of the world marked by ethnic strife. When 
that kind of nationalism prevails, then I think, as we see in Bosnia, 
people will identify themselves very narrowly with a particular, rela-
tively closed identity. 
dC: So, is a separation of church and state necessary for that? For ex-
ample, would a nation that is bound by a religious view, say Islam, be 
able to have the same questioning of their identity? 
DI: I think that a lot depends on the capacity of this religion to ~ermit 
questioning. Obviously, to the extent that religions are dogma~c and 
don't permit questioning, any state that officially assumes the gwse of a 
theocracy is going to suppress that tendency among its citize:11s. So 
much depends on the kind of state we are talking about. A state like the 
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United States, which has been touted as a sort of faceless melting pot, 
has no distinct cultural identity per se, and its dominant WASPish char-
acter is permeated by African, Asian, Latin, and Creole influences. In 
that kind of a state, citizens have more of an opportunity to explore dif-
ferent ways of being different identities. 
dC: You've talked a bit about race and identity, and you've also written 
a lot about the sharing of a common perspective so I'm wondering if 
what you're referring to as nationalism here is in a sense a nation repre-
senting a common perspective? I'm not sure why you would say then 
that Bosnia is a nation whereas the United States is not. 
DI: Well, I don't know if I would call Bosnia a nation. I would say that 
Bosnia is composed of many different nationalities. Maybe the word 
nationality here is a better word than nation, but the way I was using it, 
the word nation is closer to the word nationality. When I have talked 
about perspective in the context of race, I am thinking of a group of per-
sons who have experienced something in common, though they may 
have experienced it differently; it doesn't mean that every African 
American has experienced the same kind of discrimination, obviously. 
Maybe they haven't even experienced it personally, but it's been a part 
of their lives because their friends and family have experienced it, and 
it's something that looms on the horizon. Ethnic identity and national 
identity would also be grounded in a peculiar experience that shapes it, 
the understanding of its members in a particular way. And I suppose 
that's true. We've heard about certain nationalities being oppressed in 
various ways and even if they haven't been oppressed, their outlook on 
life has been shaped by a distinct history, however imagined and con-
structed it might be retrospectively. 
dC: For example, the Irish ... 
DI: Of course, a significant part of the Irish experience has been one of 
oppression. It would be hard to talk about Irish identity without talking 
about British imperialism. 
dC: I'm curious about something you said when you were describing 
the culture of the United States and claimed that it is primarily Anglo 
and Protestant. When I think of the culture of the United States, I don' t 
necessarily think of Anglo and Protestant, although that is a part of it. 
Were you just referring to the "Powers that Be"? 
DI: Yes, I think that what I'm referring to is the established norm that 
governs our society and continues to be largely influenced by the white 
Anglo-Protestant culture. That's obviously changing, as our culture be-
comes increasingly more diverse. However, one shouldn't underesti-
mate the attraction of assimilation, either. Immigrants tend to suppress 
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their native identity and assimilate into what they perceive as the domi-
nant culture. So I can see the United States retaining its predominant 
cultural orientation, which is increasingly becoming that of a nonde-
script, post-modern, mass-consumer culture associated with global 
capitalism. 
dC: It's interesting that you bring up the assimilation and make it 
sound as if the immigrants choose new relations. To what extent is that 
true, particularly with our brand of capitalism which is trying to 
change the world into McDonald's-land or Disneyland? It seems that 
kind of capitalism is reaching out and assimilating the rest of the world. 
So how do you reconcile those two perspectives? 
DI: Well, I don't know if those two are inconsistent. In some ways 
they're not. On the one hand, there is this predominant ideology of 
Western success that's spread throughout the world that's closely at-
tached to what is perceived to be a successful economic system: capital-
ism. The result, of course, is that people living in what was formerly 
known as the Third World shed their traditional lifestyles to adopt 
Western ways. So they start eating McDonald's hamburgers instead .of 
eating their traditional food, they start imitatin~ all of the characteris-
tics of the dominating culture. They change their abodes, they change 
their clothing, everything. To some extent, this is involuntary .in the 
sense that some cultural patterns like this are imposed from without. 
No one is there saying "OK you have to eat McDon~ld'.s hamburge.rs o! 
you have to build your house this way or wear this kind of clothing. 
Nonetheless, thanks to some three or four hundred years of European-
American colonialism this seems to be the model of success that a lot of 
people have adopted. They think of this as be~~ successful an~ at the 
same time their choice is not fully voluntary; its been constrained by 
the pressures of marketing, brainwashing to a certain extent, and p~r­
haps education, so they are being increasingly brough~ to. the point 
where they think of their own traditional folkways as being infenor to 
the Western model. 
And certainly, the governments in these so-called developing countries 
are partially responsible for that. They want to imitate what they pe:-
ceive to be the successful model of the West, so they want to gear their 
education to emphasize those values. In some ways, this can ha:e ~ 
· diti al untries m emancipatory impact, for example, m many tra on c? 
which women were not allowed to enter the work force, that s changed. 
The downside is that this confusion of more materialistic values erodes 
the traditional folkways in those cultures indiscriminate!~. I know that 
I'm touching on a difficult subject here because one doesn t want to say 
that all things in a given culture are good. Cultures are going to interact 
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with one another, they are going to change; some will die out as a result 
of that interaction. I don't want to suggest that cultures have a right to 
exist simply because they're a culture or that it's always good that a cul-
ture continue to survive. I think you have to look at it on a case by case 
basis. 
dC: I have one question but I'm going to ask it in two ways. The first 
way is in reference to Hegel in the end of The Philosophy of Right. Here 
he's talking about different nations and how it's necessary for different 
nations to exist as a full expression of the spirit. If we say that some cul-
tures are going to die out and you're not going to say that no culture 
has the right to exist, does that deny Hegel's positive conception of the 
different nations that are based on one way of life? Another way of ask-
ing this question is do you think that the loss of the Mayan culture or 
the loss of the Native American culture, which is actually a grouping 
together of various different cultures, are real losses in the sense that 
the world has missed out on something? If you answer that positively 
and say, yes, those are real losses, doesn't that imply that cultures have 
a right to exist? 
DI: Well, I don't think it implies that any particular culture has a right 
to exist. First of all, I think it's been useful to me to think of cultural di-
versity in terms of the model of natural selection in the sense that cul-
tures diversify themselves in order to adapt to peculiar environmental 
circumstances. Cultural diversity is a good thing, in that respect. In 
some ways, it reflects an economy of survival, if you will. However, 
what we see today with globalization is that particular customs of agri-
cultural consumption and production that were very adaptive are now 
being replaced. So in certain areas, for example in Chile, farmers who 
had been growing two hundred varieties of potatoes on a single acre of 
land are now being encouraged to grow one variety of potato for sale 
on a international market, a standardized potato if you will. Now there 
are a couple of bad things that happen as a result of that. First of all, 
these generic strains of potato are not as resistant to the local pests and 
vermin, and so in order to make them resistant you use lots of pesti-
cides. But the vermin and pests are able to evolve and adapt themselves 
to these pesticides and the result is you have companies like Cargill 
that are manufacturing new varieties of seeds through genetic engi-
neering. After a while, they begin to exhaust the gene pool, literally. 
And so there are real environmental limits to the extent to which you 
can impose a uniform model of production or a uniform model of living 
throughout the world. This is one of the dangers of global capitalism. 
We can think of cultures as containing repositories of knowledge for 
solving very specific, regionally specific, problems. So the elimination 
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of cultural diversity is a bad thing that restricts adaptation. I'm not ex-
plaining this in moral terms, but in naturalistic terms. Globalization is 
simply not good for the human species! 
dC: But isn't that a moral term itself? 
DI: It is. I'm assuming a kind of moral realism, or ethical naturalism, 
for the sake of argument, even though what counts as good or natural is 
something that people need to decide (or discover) given their particu-
lar cultural resources for critical self-understanding. But getting back to 
the ethics of cultural survival, I don't know if any particular culture has 
a right to exist. I don't know what that would mean. The problem here 
is that cultures, in order to adapt themselves, need to change over time, 
and in some cases the change can't be generated through the internal 
resources of a given culture. Cultures need to borrow from other cul-
tures. But the very process of borrowing or communicating with other 
cultures alters and complicates their internal identity. Cultural anthro-
pologists thought that by discovering cultures they could protect them, 
but the very process of discovery alters a culture irrevocably; it changes 
it. So that's inevitable. 
There's a tension then between one kind of multiculturalism which 
wants to preserve cultures in some sort of changeless way and the dy-
namics of communication between cultures, a more postmodern dy-
namic which acknowledges that once you have communication 
between cultures, you have change. Isolated cultures have a very hard 
time maintaining themselves. But there's a risk in the other direction as 
well. Once you open up communication between cultures; they will 
change and, in some cases, disappear or become assimilated to other 
cultures. We said that the complete elimination of cultural diversity is a 
bad thing. So what one has to do is encourage the kind of dialogue 
which will allow cultures to continue to diversify in response to one 
another, so that those aspects that are ultimately not conducive to adap-
tation or to human well-being are perhaps eliminated. For example, I 
would like to believe that traditional cultures, of whatever kind, that 
discourage women from becoming literate and independent will cease 
doing so following prolonged exposure to so-called enlightened cul-
tures. Conversely, I would like to believe that enlightened cultures of 
whatever kind that discourage the preservation of stable families, com-
munities, and environments will cease doing so following prolonged 
exposure to so-called traditional cultures. 
dC: So there's a problem of trying to strike a balance between a kind of 
universal values that are expressed in culturally diverse ways. For ex-
ample, if you take something as broad as Aristotelian eudaimonism, 
that's something that every human being should be allowed to experi-
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ence but which can be experienced on different cultural levels. 
DI: I'm sympathetic to that idea. I wouldn't describe myself as a cul-
tural relativist who denies that there are universal conditions of human 
flourishing. But you obviously have to be careful how you characterize 
such conditions. Obviously there are lots of ways in which people can 
realize them. But I think part of what it means to be a self-realized per-
son is the capacity to think about oneself. A lot of people have said that 
this particular capacity is only original to the Enlightenment culture of 
the West, but I don't think it is. 
dC: For example, individuality ... 
DI: Individuality might be a universal value for all cultures, but it takes 
a different form, depending upon the culture in question. 
dC: Politically, is it possible, do you think, to represent the interests of 
all people by having a kind of general law? For example, you say that 
color-blind politics is racist, but that doesn't seem to quite make sense, 
because we think of color-blind politics as being the democratic ideal. 
But according to you, each culture has its own perspective which isn't 
represented properly by color-blind politics. Could you say a little bit 
more about that? 
DI: Basically, I don't think that color-blind politics is inherently racist. 
In an ideal society that had overcome racism, we'd want our laws to be 
color-blind. There would, presumably, be no need for affirmative ac-
tion, at least as we understand that term. There might be, of course, 
very good reasons to continue to provide for the proportional represen-
tation of group interests. But leaving all that aside, I think that color-
blind laws within the context of a racist society are racist; they prevent 
people from seeing how race continues to function in ways that dis-
criminate against large segments of the population. In the case of cul-
ture, this is where things get complicated, because any democratic 
polity is going to conduct its business in a single language, perhaps 
several languages. In Canada, of course, the predominant language is 
still English, despite the fact that it is a bilingual country. Now, lan-
gua?es are not neutral with respect to particular perspectives. We're 
getting back to your question about whether we can think about lin-
guistic cultures shaping the horizon of understanding of particular 
peoples. I think perhaps we can. That's not to say that languages refer 
to self-contained islands of meaning for us, I don't think that's true. For 
example, I'm not one of those who would argue that there is some kind 
~f fundamental incommensurability between languages so that transla-
tion or cross-cultural understanding is impossible. I don't want to say 
that e~erything that can be said in one language can be literally trans-
lated into the other language, but that's why we have metaphors, that's 
1301 
Ide Interviews David Ingram 
why we need to create and use language in poetic ways, to try to cap-
ture what is often meant or experienced by other people. And we do 
that from within our own linguistic culture. 
dC: That's where you differ from Habermas, because Habermas seems 
to think that there are these formal properties of languages that makes 
them untranslatable, but he doesn't have that mention of metaphor. 
You don't rely strictly on these formal properties, and you bring in the 
aesthetic criteria. 
DI: Habermas has, at points, acknowledged the importance of meta-
phor. In the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, in a section in which he 
is discussing Derrida and criticizing what he takes to be Derrida's re-
duction of philosophy to literature, Habermas insists that philosophy 
can't be reduced to literature, that it has to be understood as a kind of 
ra tional reconstruction of universal norms. Yet, in the very same breath, 
he acknowledges that philosophy has to have this metaphorical or rhe-
torical dimension. So Derrida isn't entirely wrong, because philosophy 
addresses the whole range of human experiences , not just simply the 
cognitive, but also the affective or the emotional, the practical, the 
moral, and all these things. As he puts it, philosophy unlike the more 
differentiated sciences, relates to our everyday life, and so has to medi-
ate between different modalities of experience. In everyday life, all of 
these modalities mediate one another. So for Habermas, in order for 
philosophy to communicate its own rational reconstruction in a way 
that will resonate with our lives, it also has to use metaphor and anal-
ogy; it has to become literary. 
Now I think that's a very interesting concession on Habermas' part. In 
some ways he's agreeing with Derrida here that philosophy cannot 
simply be a language of rational reconstruction, but that it also has to 
rely upon rhetorical tropes to convey its meaning fully. In another con-
text, Habermas acknowledges that in everyday argumentation, we 
draw upon reasons of different sorts. Some of the reasons we draw 
upon are of a factual nature, some of them are of a normative nature, 
some of them again are of an affective or emotional nature and, al-
though from a standpoint of pure logic these different kinds of reasons 
are incommensurable, these reasons all come together in the process of 
trying to make a compelling case for what we are trying to defend. 
Look at the way art critics argue. They appeal to objective characteris-
tics of art- things like line, shape, texture. But they also frame these ob-
jective descriptions in terms of metaphors that relate to human 
experiences. We talk about Picasso's Blue Period in paintings. Well, 
blue is obviously an objective characteristic, but of course it also has all 
kinds of emotional resonances that affect the way in which we evaluate 
that painting. 
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Think of the concept of truth here. We can talk about the truthfulness of 
a particular objective statement in description and we can also talk 
about the way in which works of art are truthful in their selective rev-
elation of what is essential, genuine, authentic, or simply new. Here 
again, Habermas seems to acknowledge the importance of metaphor up 
to a point. He even understands that arguments are not deductive 
chains of reasoning in which terms always have unequivocal meanings. 
I say up to a point because he also insists that in order for persons to 
achieve rational consensus on some disputed matter, that they have to 
do so for the very same reasons. But, he's begun to shift away from that 
view, for he now realizes that people often reach agreement for differ-
ent reasons. 
dC: At one point you said that aesthetics-metaphor-involved an 
emotional element and that interested me. Habermas's discussions al-
ways appear non-emotional. All that matters is logic and reason. Do 
you think Habermas recognizes this problem or has an answer? 
DI: In an essay that he wrote in the seventies, he points out that a per-
fectly rational life would not necessarily be fulfilling, if this required 
uprooting people from the traditional ways of life that gave their life 
meaning. This still troubles him, I think. I don't know if he ever really 
resolved this problem in his own theory, but he has tried to incorporate 
affective and emotive elements of communication by pointing out that 
most of our conversations involve feelings. First of all, he points out 
that morality is tied to strong feelings of disgust or guilt. Second of all, 
he points out that when we rationally discuss what's right or what's 
wrong in a particular situation, we are sometimes led to consider our 
needs. Justifying norms in terms of satisfaction of general interests be-
gins to efface the distinction between the right and the good. We begin 
to talk about what's just in terms of the particular needs and interests of 
specific groups of persons, in terms of what conduces to their happi-
ness. And while Habermas had insisted on privileging questions of jus-
tice over questions of happiness, he does not think that we can talk 
about the justice of particular legal institutions in terms that are abso-
lutely neutral with respect to the particular ethical values and goods es-
teemed by society. Thus, it is clear that the division between the right 
and the good is one that he has himself relativized, so that rational con-
versations about justice invariably draw upon traditional conceptions 
of meaningfulness and goodness. 
dC: And that's the importance of having representatives who share 
your perspective. My sense of what you say in your paper, "Racial Re-
districting," is that representable identity is that which is represented 
by someone who shares your perspective. Something that you said just 
now points to a way to clear up a question I had about that paper. You 
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say that "I am not saying that only a member of an oppressed minority 
can fully understand that minority's perspective." If it's not requisite 
that only members of a minority can understand that minority's per-
spective, why is it that a minority's perspective cannot be represented 
by, say, an old white guy? 
DI: Well, it's not that they can't be so represented. It's a question of 
how effectively they'll be represented ... 
dC: Is that practical or theoretical or both? 
DI: It's both. It's practical in the sense that if someone who has experi-
enced discrimination talks about it, that's going to have a ring of au-
thenticity. In that sense perhaps, first person accounts of discrimination 
are especially efficacious. But I also want to suggest that-and this gets 
to the question of justice-there's something wrong about not allowing 
members of oppressed classes of persons to actually have a voice or be 
represented in person in legislative chambers. They have to elect some 
of their own members, and this is a question of justice. That doesn' t 
come off quite as strongly in this paper. I'm not sure how to go about 
defending it fully except to argue that it is a matter of according respect 
to groups. Once we acknowledge that there are social groups and that 
some of these social groups legitimately define themselves and under-
stand themselves in terms of the category of race, let's say, we would be 
showing those groups disrespect by not ensuring that a significant per-
centage of them were physically represented in legislative bodies to 
give first-hand accounts of what it's like to be discriminated against. 
dC: Do we need more African-Americans in Congress to have fair rep-
resentation for African-Americans? 
DI: That's not required for increasing or maximizing the interests of the 
black community. In fact, as I point out in my paper, one of the ironies 
of racial redistricting was that fewer Democrats were elected-and 
more Republicans were elected-which didn't advance the interests of 
the black community. So that though there was increased black pres-
ence in Congress, there was a decreased support for black interests. I 
am not sure that I want to say that single seat districts will make pos-
sible a better representation of perspective as opposed to a maximiza-
tion of interests. I am not sure that they would be better at doing that 
than multi-seat districts of the sort championed by Lani Guinier. The 
thing about multi-seat districts is that they are so large that representa-
tion gets spread over many communities and constituencies. Thus, 
there is always a danger that minority representatives elected in these 
districts will be beholden to better funded and better organized white 
constituencies, and will be less attentive to the interests of their minor-
ity constituencies. 
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dC: There were two things I want to pick up on from earlier. We spoke 
of justice and the good life-the right versus the good. Which one do 
you think is prior? For example, we spoke before about eudaimonia-a 
conception of the good-grounding universal rights, does that mean 
that the good is prior to justice? 
DI: I do not want to privilege either. One can ground certain abstract 
categories of right. But the way in which they get qualified very much 
depends upon the values of our community. One can see this in the 
way freedom of speech is treated in the UK versus the US. Here we can 
talk about hate speech codes. I do not think that such codes are appro-
priate in all contexts. I think a lot depends on the local communities and 
institutions involved. Within educated settings that institutionalize 
forms of inclusive civil discussion, hate speech rips apart the very so-
cial fabric in which learning occurs. 
So we might be able to talk, as Habermas does, about certain universal 
categories of right, but when it comes to specifying them in any con-
crete way, we invariably do so with respect to the institutions and val-
ues that define our communities. We do so to ensure the 
well-functioning of this institution or community. Certainly, all kinds 
of conflicts arise between individual rights and the rights of communi-
ties. And a lot depends on which community we're talking about. 
Whenever we talk, for example, about freedom of speech within the 
context of debates regarding obscenity and pornography, the legal 
question always speaks to what average persons would find objection-
able in light of community standards. No mention is here made of the 
fact that each of us inhabits many different communities whose mem-
bers are never simply average. 
dC: I think the average person of one community might have different 
standards than the average person of another community. For example, 
people in Bath County, Kentucky might have a different set of stan-
dards than people in Cincinnati, Ohio and wouldn't want to live by the 
other's. 
DI: I think that community standards ought to play some-but not nec-
essarily decisive-role in determining the boundaries of individual 
rights. But the question is which community, and how do we draw a 
line? In other words, we might have a case of an isolated community 
that is extremely conservative surrounded by a society which is much 
more liberal. Which reference point should take more precedent? We 
can enter all kinds of debates about which is the proper reference point 
for resolving this debate. 
dC: There are certain things that are acceptable in a given community 
that other communities would find generally reprehensible. Take the 
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example of female genital mutilation. It continues to be practiced even 
though communities around those places in Africa that practice it and 
people around the world find it absolutely reprehensible. That compli-
cates the whole idea of the average person in a community, too, when 
"the whole world is against you," so to speak. Does their standard not 
count in that situation anymore? 
DI: We often think of communities as self-contained when they are re-
ally not. It is a difficult question because many of the women who sub-
mit themselves to genital mutilation do so for many reasons. 
Obviously, to look at it from the point of view of men, it is a way of pro-
tecting their women-or perhaps more accurately, of protecting their 
patrilineage, property or what have you. In any case the idea seems to 
be that with weakened sexual sensation, mutilated wives aren't going 
to go around sleeping with other men. From the perspective of some 
women, this might also be a good thing because they think their hus-
bands will be more loyal to them as well. From that perspective there is 
a certain logic to it. But from another perspective-which might be ours 
but also theirs, it appears to be a manifestation of male dominance over 
women. There are yet other ways in which that practice can be repre-
sented- as a quasi-religious ritual, as a way of snubbing Western cul-
tural and economic imperialism, etc. 
dC: This discussion of community leads to another question-do na-
tions represent one community or do nations represent multiple com-
munities? For example, earlier you said that there are different 
perspectives and different communities in the US. In that sense, it is not 
a traditional nation in the Hegelian sense. What defines a community, 
and should each community be a nation in terms of having its own sov-
ereignty? Earlier you said that nationalism is representative of one per-
spective. 
DI: The vast majority of countries are now multinational or at least 
multicultural. Part of the dynamic fueling this condition are migrations 
that have been stimulated by economic displacements. This phenomena 
has become more aggravated in the last twenty years. With the global 
consolidation of capitalism and world markets, we're seeing more eco-
nomic destabilization throughout the globe resulting in more migra-
tions, more cultural mixing. 
In terms of whether a nation should represent one community, well, 
there are different communities- and different notions of community. 
The French especially have addressed this issue, I have in mind Je~­
Luc Nancy and Derrida. Their response seems to b.e ~at ~ommuruty 
cannot be based upon any Hegelian conception of S1ttl1chke1t, common 
substance, or identity that persons share, but needs to be thought of as 
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another kind of sharing. They are not too clear on what this kind of 
sharing is. I am comfortable with the idea that when we think about 
communities, we are thinking of many things-neighborhoods, church 
and country club associations, solidarities based on similar histories, 
and the like. We need to get clearer about what community means here. 
Is it always linked to something-culture, kinship, values-shared in 
common? 
dC: It depends on what you are focusing on. Is that shared commonal-
ity what unites a certain group of people? Depending upon what level 
one is focusing, one is talking about neighborhood; but if one is talking 
about a shared experience, you may not be speaking of people who live 
close but people who share certain values and histories. It seems the 
way we have been talking about community, community is something 
other than governmentally-defined areas of space. 
DI: Certainly some communities transcend geographical or political 
boundaries. Others may be concentrated in a particular geographical 
place. But what is important is that there is something, that there be 
common reference points for identification, such that whether they are 
shared in exactly the same way by all persons is perhaps less important 
than the fact that they are shared in some manner or other by most. 
dC: One way we can situate this discussion arises in the last chapter of 
Reason, History and Politics. There you say that a community is united by 
a narrative which motivates metaphors, etc. Can you say how narrative 
affects the community? 
DI: If there are different narratives, can we still talk about a founding 
myth, or founding metaphors shared by a community? That is a diffi-
cult question. The problem is that metaphors and myths are constantly 
being reappropriated in different ways. They are exhausted, or as 
Nancy puts it, they are continually undone and deconstructed. The 
funny thing about a myth is that it plays upon the ambiguity of the 
originary and fictive basis of language itself. Think of the Greek myths; 
here one is reminded of language perfectly imitating nature. So there is 
this aspect of myth-something that is original and founding, for a par-
ticular natural community, conceived as "race," "nation," or "people." 
At the same time, there is the fictive quality of myth as mere invention. 
Despite the reinvention of racism and nationalism, myths in the mod-
em world no longer found our identities in the way they once did for 
our forebearers. We still have our myths. But these have the fabricated 
sense of being ideologies that can be manipulated in different ways. In 
this sense, the Roots myth, which inspired so many African-Americans 
to trace their identity back to Africa, still retains the underlying vestige 
of racism, at least insofar as it conceals their complexly constituted 
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poly-centric identities behind the facade of a single origin and destiny, 
grounded in a definite race, geography and culture. 
dC: How do you reply to the postmodern retort that all one has is nar-
rative, there's nothing more real than that? 
DI: I agree that all experience is mediated by the stories we tell about 
ourselves, experiences that are meaningless unless they are organized 
into some kind of coherent story. Still, I want to say the experiences are 
real. 
dC: Another example is the experience of indigenous people and how 
they understand land. Europeans understand land as property, but for 
Native Americans, for example, the land is not property but this reli-
gious, or spiritual, place where our ancestors lie. But according to our 
legal concepts, land is property. Litigation occurs between indigenous 
people and white people. The indigenous people experience the land as 
spiritual existence, and white people do not. Unfortunately, the law 
forces the issue to be addressed in terms of property right. Law cannot 
encompass land in terms of a different conception. 
DI: The reservation system as it has evolved has focused more on iden-
tifying the sovereign rights of indigenous people. This is both good and 
bad. Currently the Bill of Rights does not apply with full force to reser-
vations. On certain reservations, Indians who have converted to certain 
fundamentalist Protestant religions find themselves discriminated 
against by the tribe. On the one hand, this is tribal land. If you convert 
to another religion that promotes a radically different way of living on 
the land, then maybe you ought to leave it. On the other hand, tribal 
communities should tolerate more cultural diversity, within their ranks 
even if it threatens their traditional identities. 
dC: This involves communication where we have to find out about 
other people's experiences. To find ways to understand them by seeing 
what compares in one's own experience that is comparable to that expe-
rience. That is why we are called to try understand each other. 
DI: That seems to be what (Alasdaire) Macintyre and Gean-Franc;oise) 
Lyotard say in different ways. Lyotard seems to be saying that we are 
obligated to discover new ways of putting something that we couldn't 
say before. We have to invent new languages to try to address some of 
the injustices of the differend. Macintyre seems to be saying something 
more problematic. Somehow, persons have to be able to adopt some 
form of split consciousness, as if they're inhabiting two languages- a 
home language and a new language. But he never quite explains how 
this happens. But both philosophers believe that languages are incom-
mensurable-incapable of being translated fully into one another- yet 
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open to some kind of partial translation, if one can use that term. 
dC: So it sounds like there is no problem of incommensurability. 
DI: Here I accept Donald Davidson's argument. He argues that in order 
to know that two languages are incommensurable, one would already 
have to know what was said in them. But knowing this involves trans-
lating the two languages into a common language, thereby undermin-
ing the whole incommensurability argument. So, I do think that 
languages can be translated into each other, but I do not mean that they 
can be translated literally. This is why we need to use language meta-
phorically in order to capture what is being said in another language. 
The problem of incommensurability occurs only on the level of formal 
translatability where one attempts to take a term from one language 
and translate it into a term in another language. 
dC: So is there a contention between Habermas and Lyotard or 
Habermas and Macintyre? 
DI: Well, I think there is a debate, But the debate concerns how they 
configure language itself, as a medium of understanding. The problem 
with Lyotard is that he invokes the concept of incommensurability in 
ways that suggest that understanding is much more problematic than it 
really is. He invokes it to suggest that our everyday political discourse 
is fraught with injustice, incommensurability, or contradictions. In de-
fending a political policy, for instance we appeal to moral, factual, and 
evaluative claims, often indiscriminately. Lyotard suggests that there is 
an inherent differend there, because these claims are incommensurable. 
they're all logically distinct, and yet, at any given moment, one seems 
to trump all the others. I don't think that language is so contradictory. I 
also don't treat it as "agonal" as Lyotard says it is. as being so agonal. Of 
course, we use language as a way of fighting, contesting, negotiating. 
Power relations, as Foucault points out, inform our everyday discursive 
practices. But I don't see communication as primarily a strategic at-
tempt to win, gain the initiative, or silence the other. Rather, it's equally 
a play of dialogue, in the Gadamerian sense. Of course, we're trying to 
keep up with the conversation, and this means, at appropriate mo-
ments, taking the initiative. But this gaming-however strategic it 
might seem-is simultaneously subordinated to the overall aim of com-





Such a sweet and quiet place, 
of winding cobbled streets, 
where few wander in the rain 
to see knickknacks on sills, 
the painted window frames, 
wooden doors and lacy curtains, 
tidy facades, so picturesque. 
The river Slien roils 
as the rain drips darkly. 
The picture cannot be taken 
that will show this town; 
something will be cropped, 
something missing: the buried, 
the wounded, the ghosts. 
They are not altogether hidden. 
Some sleep in the cemetery 
in the center of the square-
Danish names and German names, 
grey marble, speckled granite, 
tombstones slick with death. 
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